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THE

WESTERN AND EASTERN QUESTIONS

OF EUROPE.

BY ELIHU BURRITT.

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AUTHOR'S NOTE.

Several intelligent and influential readers having expressed the opinion that the reflections herewith presented to the public were worth preserving in a more permanent form than the daily papers in which they first appeared, the Author submits them in a pamphlet and commends them to the thoughtful consideration of both American and English minds interested in the great questions that have come, or are soon to come, to the front before the civilized world.

New Britain, Conn., March 20, 1871.

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Questions of Western Europe.

The Cost of Small Nationalities.

The hyperbole of popular comparisons or measurements may exaggerate contrasts, but they make them impressive. It is common to hear even a poor man say this or that "is worth its weight in gold," sometimes even when the this or that is his bright and active boy of fifteen years, and weighing a hundred pounds avoirdupois. This simile exaggerates the relative value of the two things compared, but the estimate expressed is clear and impressive. The same simile reversed may be applied even more truthfully to entities in the political world, which have been held at a higher price than they are worth to themselves or to mankind. By the simile reversed, I mean that there are several small nationalities in Europe which cost their weight in gold, though they are worth virtually nothing to themselves as political communities, and less than nothing to the great family of nations. And this vast cost of their worthless being is not borne by themselves, but by outside Powers and peoples. Their present political existence is of no more value to their own subjects than each of seven kingdoms would be to its subjects if England were again resolved into the old Saxon heptarchy, or if France were reparceled into as many independent States.

Let us glance at the status of these small nationalities as they appear in the scale of dignity. They are the "unprotected females" in the community of European nations. They themselves no more pretend to the ability of self-standing and self-defending powers than does a lone and defenceless woman sojourning or traveling among rude and stalwart men. Her very weakness is her safety. She feels and trusts it as such. She believes it will enlist some stout and gallant champion in her defense, should she be assaulted by a ruffian. This weakness may be safety, but it is not dignity. And this weakness is not the *raison d'être*, but the *pouvoir d'être*, of these small nationalities. And it is a wonder that en-

lightened patriotism can see in them a reason for independent existence. Their subjects are yet as patriotic as those of the Great Powers, and as intelligent, doubtless. But, with all this patriotism, they must at times see and feel how the pigmy stature of their little State dwarfs their own political status. What is their opinion, what is their political entity worth, when weighed against that of the same number of Englishmen, French, Prussians, or Russians? What is the weight of their Government's opinion or ability in a great "question" that moves Christendom?

Let us glance at the reason and value of these small States in the light of the freedom, the liberal institutions, and the general "rights of man," which they procure and maintain for their subjects or citizens. Take Ireland, for example. Could any form of independent nationality, under a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, raise an Irishman one political inch above an Englishman on the sister island, or in any quality or enjoyment of freedom to think, speak, move, or act in "the pursuit of happiness?" Would the "repeal of the Union," or a republic, cheapen a single acre of land, or even transfer one to a new owner without pay to somebody? Ireland elects and sends to the Imperial Parliament more representatives *pro rata* of her population than she would be allowed to send to Washington were she united to the American Republic. If independent, would she send more or better representatives to Dublin? If she could and did, could and would they be more unanimous at Dublin than in London, or make better laws for the best good of her people than they could if equally honest and united in the British Parliament? In a word, could any form of national independence give an Irishman in Ireland a single possibility of freedom in "the pursuit of happiness" which he cannot enjoy or reach, as a subject of the United Kingdom, on the same footing as an Englishman in England?

We might go around the whole circle of would-be independent nationalities, and apply the same questions to them. Crossing the diameter of this circle, what, may we ask, can the subjects of the two Danubian Principalities be, enjoy, or hope more than they could if they were part and parcel of the Austrian Empire? What possibilities of progress, freedom, political dignity and material prosperity can the motley populations of European Turkey attain under the Mohammedan rule of Constantinople, which they could not possess under the Russian sceptre at St. Petersburg? What liberties do the few millions of Sweden enjoy, or pretend to, which the population of Denmark do not possess and use? What is the *raison d'être?* Wherein does it pay, in political privilege or status, to keep up two independent nationalities for Spain and Portugal? To use a term

more familiar to the American than perhaps to any other community, these old sovereignties do not pay, in dignity, strength, and freedom, for what they expend themselves to keep up their independent existence.

But, in some cases at least, where one of these small nationalities has paid out of its own pocket a farthing for its own deceptive and fruitless independence, the "Great Powers" around it have paid a pound sterling as their annuity on this life assurance policy. If any thoughtful reader thinks this an aggravated estimate, let him just glance at the causes of all the wars in Europe for the last two hundred years, at the "wars of succession," or wars to maintain a "balance of power." Let him analyze the composition of the English national debt, and see how much the nationality of Spain has cost the English people, and how they have been paid in ingratitude and indignity for their money and their blood. Why, a few days ago the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, stated that England's bill of costs in the Crimean War was £80,000,000 in money, not counting the blood she poured out like water in the struggle. Now $400,000,000, besides the sacrifice of precious life, was a pretty large sum to sweat out of the incomes and industries of the English people in less than two years. It was a pretty large sum for them to pay for the sham *autonomy* of two Danubian provinces, or even for the existence of Turkey itself as an independent nationality. But this sum is small compared with the cost of Belgium to England. It involved a great expense to France and other outside nations to rive that small country from Holland, one of the freest and most solidly prosperous nations in Europe; one of the first maritime countries in the world, of which Belgium formed a part, and from which she could have derived as much advantage as any section of the Netherlands. Well, from the time this new nationality was first set upon its feet, its "protection" has cost England more than it has Belgium itself. Although three or four other Great Powers signed the guarantee papers with her, she knows that not one of them attached more obligation to the compact than to the old vitiated Treaty of Vienna; that not one of them feels bound to fight for Belgium, unless its own individual interests were involved. So England has virtually assumed the whole obligation and cost of defending that small nationality. From the date of the treaty, 1839, she has apprehended an attack upon the independence of her protégé, and she has felt bound to prepare to resist such an attack. For thirty years or more, the invasion of Belgium has been one of the front-rank probabilities for which she has provided in her armed peace establishments. It is a moderate estimate that these preparations for the defense of Belgium

have cost England £5,000,000 a year for the last thirty years. She has just now voted £2,000,000, as an extra appropriation, to provide against the increased peril of the hour. But this sum is only a small instalment of the amount involved in her military armaments in behalf of Belgium. If no outside Power touches that little Kingdom with its little finger, this new danger will cost England £20,000,000. But think of what would come if either Prussia or France should attack Belgium. England has just released all the other parties that signed with her the Belgian guarantee; she has engaged, single-handed, to enter into this tremendous struggle, and fight for France or against France for the independence of Belgium. Just think for one moment of the illimitable peril of blood and treasure involved in this obligation, whichever horn of the dilemma England shall be obligated to take. Suppose, at some desperate crisis of this conflict, Prussia should violate the territory of Belgium, and France should call upon England to fulfill the letter of her bond, and send her iron-clad fleet to the Baltic to shell the Prussian ports, bombard Berlin, and depose and capture Victoria's eldest daughter, and destroy Potsdam and all the royal palaces. Or pursue the alternative, and suppose that England should oblige herself, by this new bond, to join Prussia in the complete subjugation of France. In either case, when all that Belgium shall have cost England, from 1839 to the end of the chapter, shall have been computed, will not the total illustrate the cost of small nationalities?

The Balance-of-Power Regime.

In these weeks of centuries for days, Christendom is making history very fast. Changes of public opinion are worthy of being put in the front rank with the events which this history is to record. Does the general appreciation of these momentous events indicate a change of public opinion in reference to the policy in which they originated? The American mind never had much occasion to be exercised in regard to the balance-of-power régime on this Continent. Virtually, as a nation, we have no neighbors, in the European sense, or none to fear or oppose our growth and expansion. We would not admit for a moment that the neighbors we have on the north and south have any reason to fear insult or injury from us in consequence of this rapid and immense growth of our national territory and power. We believe, and would have them believe, that Canada and Mexico are just as safe from any violation of their rights on our part as

they were when we did not number ten millions. We have this full faith in ourselves in regard to our disposition and intentions toward our weaker neighbors. We will not now stop to inquire if we should have the like faith in them if the case were reversed, and they were growing at our rate and we at theirs.

One thing is quite evident: the American mind clearly sympathizes with Prussia in this tremendous struggle with France, and seems to throw upon the French the onus or responsibility of the war. It is true that, perhaps, three out of every four Americans charge Louis Napoleon with being the cause of the war, though nothing is more certain than that his fiercest opponents were the most eager to rush into it, and he the most reluctant to cast his all upon the terrible hazard of the sword. The whole English nation leans to Prussia as manifestly as the American does. Now, a common and equal suspicion or dislike of the French Emperor, doubtless has a good deal to do with this bias in both cases. But, I am confident that no fair-minded and intelligent American or Englishman, on second thought, would believe that if Napoleon had never been born, or if France had been a republic since 1848, this war would have been avoided. To believe that it would have been avoided, one must believe that the domination of the old balance-of-power régime over the sentiment and policy of nations has been broken. Does the sentiment of America, England, and of other countries that side with Prussia, indicate this belief? Does it show the progress of a great change in public opinion in regard to the free growth and expansion of nations? that one has no cause to fear the simple increase of territory, population, and power on the part of its neighbor? If this new and more hopeful public opinion is beginning to manifest itself in this way, is it inspired by a sentiment like our American faith in our own fair and honorable mind and intent toward our neighbors? Does it proceed from a new or increasing confidence in the disposition and policy of great and growing Powers? To bring it to a most practical actuality, is it the sentiment of outside nations that France had no cause of fear in the growth and power of Prussia, though it absorbed into itself and wielded the whole German-speaking empire on the Continent?

For one, I should be rejoiced to believe that the public sentiment of the great majority of Christian nations had reached this "consummation so devoutly to be wished." What a change such a sentiment must bring into the relationships and policies of the Great Powers in time to come! How different from the sentiment of those Powers which led to the Crimean war! Then Russia crossed the Pruth and threatened to hold two or three Danubian principalities as hostages or guarantees for the better

treatment on the part of Turkey of her Christian subjects, or for the better observance of some of her treaty stipulations in their behalf. The balance-of-power régime trembled with angry emotion at this covert or fancied attack upon its domination. England, France, Italy, and Turkey arose in arms to resist and avenge it. Not one iota of faith was given to the protestations of Russia that she did not intend to add an acre to her territory by her movement against Turkey. No; she was not to be trusted for a moment. If let alone, she would hold the Danubian Provinces in permanent possession after Turkey had conceded her claims. Then she would go on from step to step until she had conquered and annexed the whole of European Turkey. Then, with this additional force, she would set out on her march against Western Europe. The vanquished Turks would give her power to tread down Austria and Prussia, and, gathering force from extinguished nationalities, she would overpower France and then make England the last victim of her victories.

Such apparently was the sentiment of England, France, and Italy in regard to Russia; and the American mind seemed to share or sanction it to some extent. What a great and hopeful change! No European Power has ever expanded its territory and dominion so rapidly as Prussia during the last ten years. She has subdued or annexed to herself a full half dozen Belgiums in population and territory. She went to war with Austria, and drove her out of the door of Germany for a cause which not one well-read American in a hundred can describe or remember. Within the last decade she has made herself from a second-rate Power to the first in Europe in every element of strength. But she is a highly-educated and honorable nation, and the world may repose confidence in her good intentions. She would be as unlikely to injure or insult a neighboring nation, in consequence of her increased power, as the United States would be in regard to our weaker neighbors. France ought to have shared this feeling of confidence, and not to have looked upon the growth of this great Power, abutting upon the whole line of her territory, either with hostility or alarm.

To my mind this change of public opinion in regard to the growth of nations, if it is real and permanent, is one of the most hopeful signs for the time present and to come. If it is really a radical change of opinion it must abolish wars, and, what are almost worse, the half-crushing armed peace establishments of Christendom; for they belong to the balance-of-power policy. If, for instance, the French Government should some day become so liberal, so like the Belgian, that the Belgian people should vote unanimously to become part and parcel of France in order to avoid the

expense of an independent nationality, and to feel themselves equal subjects of a great Empire, it would be comforting to believe that Great Britain would not oppose it or fear the annexation or union, but would believe in the honorable intentions of the French nation thus augmented, and consequently would not apprehend that they would make Antwerp another Cherbourg as a menace to so confiding a neighbor.

England's Position and Duty from an Outside Stand-Point.

At this remarkable crisis in the history of Europe, the position and duty of England are earnestly discussed by the most influential organs of public opinion at home and abroad. English, American, German, French, and many other writers and speakers of different countries and languages, are laboring to demonstrate what England should do or not do at this juncture. I therefore venture with deference to put forth a few thoughts on this exciting question from a stand-point which, I regret to notice, so few American journalists and public men seem disposed to adopt.

"Blood is thicker than water," even though the water may be stirred from the bottom by some temporary excitement. And the common blood of our two great nations will never grow thinner than it is now. We have a long march side by side before us; and we must feel more interest in the right wing of the grand army than any outside nation can do. If, instead of keeping step with us, it turns aside to fight with wind-mills, or imaginary enemies, we must lose some of the great victories for mankind which we might win and share together. And to a man of plain, common sense, most of the arguments that are now being pressed upon England seem calculated to drag her out and far from the high road to these victories. For it is the most prominent feature of these arguments that they are based upon an old traditional sentiment as well as policy of the English government and people. They insist that, although England may quite transform her traditional home policy, her old traditional sentiment and attitude toward foreign countries must be maintained for the sake of consistency, if from no other motive; that, though it is safe and right to enfranchise and trust what so recently were regarded as dangerous classes at home, it is unsafe to trust to the honor and good faith of neighboring nations, or even to relax the traditional suspicion of their evil intentions.

Now this traditional foreign policy is founded in an old and sedulously stimulated sentiment of suspicion, which alone can sustain it. But it was an old sentiment that inspired and upheld that home policy which the

English people have condemned and transformed. And that foreign policy which has involved England in such sacrifices of blood and treasure must drag her into still bloodier wars if the sentiment that sustains it is not changed. Why should it outlive the public feeling and opinion which she has changed on so many other questions? To an American, of average intelligence and sincere respect and good will for the mother country, it is a wonder that she can still burden her heart and soul with such suspicions of other governments and peoples; that she can feel her place and safety so endangered by the mere growth of a neighboring nation in territory and population.

I would appeal to a history as fresh and vivid as the events of yesterday. Did not the whole English nation, as loudly as ours, condemn such a suspicion on the part of France towards Prussia? Did they not believe and say as strongly as we did, that France had no reason to fear the erection and consolidation of this new and vast German power abutting upon her territory for its whole length, and almost flanking it at both ends? Why did they, as well as we, believe and say this? Neither they nor we wished France to expose herself to any danger, to any insult or incivility from her new and powerful neighbor. This was the reason. We had the fullest confidence in the honorable disposition and good faith of Prussia. If all the German states, including Austria, had united with her in one consolidated empire, with Frederick William on the throne, and Bismarck on his right and Moltke on his left hand, would not England as well as America have said to France, "You have nothing to fear; these Germans are a peace-loving, honorable race. Don't go and increase your army on their account; don't yield to any suspicion of their good faith and intent toward you as a neighbor?"

Well, now, is not Belgium as much French in language, religion, proximity, and other affinities, as Hanover was Prussian? Suppose all these affinities, in addition to other more social forces, should work out the voluntary union of France and Belgium in one consolidated, one-hearted nationality. Would it not be our duty, and the first and best we owed England, to say to her as a nation what she and we said to France: "Don't be uneasy about this union. France and Belgium have only done what you and Scotland did under the first James, and perhaps in the same way. This union is no more dangerous to you than was the act to France that made your two kingdoms one. You believed, as fully as we, in the good faith and peaceable disposition of the Germans towards the French. Let us both believe the same of the French toward you. Why, Prussia has united to herself nearly half a dozen Belgiums in territory and population.

Don't fear French invasion or French insult, because they have added only four or five millions to their census. Trust their honor and good faith as neighbors. They have as much to gain and hope for from peace and unity with you as you have with them. Believe that what you would not do unto them they would not do unto you. This faith will be worth more to you than all the iron-clads you could put on the ocean."

Every American who wishes England well must feel anxious lest she should yield at this juncture to the loud advocates of her old traditional policy founded in this suspicion of her neighbors. All who feel that the whole human family has a large stake in her well being, must regard with concern the position which she has assumed and resumed in regard to both Belgium and Turkey. An observing, friendly outsider might well wonder if the English people are really aware of what they have taken upon themselves by assuming these obligations towards each of those countries. We might well ask them to consider for a moment what is involved in their renewed obligation to Belgium, and what would result from it in a very probable contingency. The leading journalists and statesmen of England do not mince matters when speaking of her traditional policy toward that State, and the main reason for it. That policy will never allow the union of Belgium with France, because it would endanger the safety of England to allow the French to possess Antwerp, which they could make another Cherbourg. Rather than permit such a union, they would go to war with France. Just think what this determination involves. Is it not clear to every intelligent mind that, if the union did create such a danger, the more spontaneous and unanimous the union the more imminent the peril, according to the old logic of suspicion? For if the union were effected by force or fraud, the Belgians would be hostile to the French, and be a source of weakness instead of strength. In that case Antwerp would not be so dangerous to England as it could be if the two populations were heartily united in will, interest, and policy. Then would not the advocates of the old balance-of-power theory make a strong case, and argue that the fairer the means and motives to the union, the greater the danger to England? They might, according to their logic, go further still in case that Belgium should be the first to make the advance, and charge her with being the most criminal party to the dangerous union, and to merit the first and severest punishment from England.

This is the complexion to which this old policy of suspicion must come at last. If maintained to the bitter end of its argument, it engages to crush a people in the clearest, fairest exercise of its inherent and inalienable right to change its own nationality. It imposes the burden, the weak-

ness and insignificance of a *protected* independence upon a State that is unable to stand upon its feet without outside help. If its people prefer such a condition, well and good; if not, equally well. Their will, interest and right are not to be weighed against other great interests in the balance-of-power scales. Now could any thing be more repulsive to the great masses of the English people than this act of forcible compression upon a small but independent State? But this old traditional balance-of-power policy inevitably involves and contemplates such an act of violence and wrong. And the living, breathing, speaking soul of this policy is a suspicion of the bad faith and evil intentions of neighboring nations. To change, to transform this costly and perilous sentiment, would be the best service the true friends of England could render to her, or to the peace of the world.

Comparative Duties and Relations to France.

A great number of reading and thinking men must notice the fact that many of our leading journals of both political parties denounce the policy and attitude of England towards France. They seem to taunt her with cowardice and meanness; with love of money and love of life; with fear to impose upon her people the sacrifice of blood and treasure which a war for the rescue of her neighbor would involve. In applying to her these epithets, they never seem to recognize any corresponding relations and duties of the United States to France. This omission seems hardly fair to either of the parties. Indeed, it implies a virtue on our part as a nation which we can hardly claim.

What, then, ought England to do for France that she has not done from the beginning of this fearful struggle to the present moment? Could she have done anything more than she did do to prevent the war? Did the United States, or any other power than England, even attempt to do anything to prevent it? Since the commencement of the war to the present moment, have the United States, or any power than England, even attempted to end it, *a propria motu*, by any actual effort? Has any negotiation between Prussia and France for an armistice, or any preliminary step toward peace, been effected by or through any other power than England? It is true that General Burnside, as a mere private individual, has labored generously to induce a conference between the two belligerents that might lead to peace. But, on the other hand, the almost premier

general of the United States and in their pay and duty, has been following the German army almost as an actual member of its royal staff, receiving its honors and hospitalities, and imparting to it the whole value of his experience in our civil war.

What, then, should England do as a former ally and near neighbor to France? Was she at fault because, like us, she could not approve of the cause of the war? With all her duty to France as an ally and friendly neighbor, ought she to have said to her, even by implication: "Go on; pitch into Prussia, with whatever cause you avow or entertain, and if you are worsted we will step in and rescue you from the humiliation you intended to inflict upon her?" Does not the vigorous, decisive policy which so many of our influential journals and public men urge upon England, mean all this? Certainly they cannot believe that any mere threat on her part could affect Prussia, or check her design or progress, unless backed by an armed force that could and would arrest her. Such a threat would do no more to this end than the noisy gongs the Chinese beat to frighten the British army in their first battle with them. What force, then, could England alone bring into the field that would be of any account to thwart or check the German armies? Remember what took place in the Crimean war; how it required nearly all the available ships of western Europe, and many of North America, to convey 100,000 English and French troops, with their armaments, to Sebastopol. Suppose England should find ships enough to land in Franee every soldier in her regular army, with all their cavalry, cannon, and other munitions of war. Suppose she could muster a force even of 100,000 men on French soil, what would they be and do, even with the fortress of Metz or Sedan to back them, before 600,000 Germans, who would face them with their terrible artillery?

But let us be as liberal as its sanguine friends would wish as to the possibilities of such an intervention. Let us suppose that England could land 100,000 men in France; that such an army, with the French forces, would beat back the Germans from Paris, and even from the last acre of French territory; that she could impose an ultimatum upon Germany, or say: "Thus far shalt thou come, and no further." Would not the question then arise: "How far shall she come, and no further?" Shall she have any French territory? "Not an acre!" cries France, from peasant to prince. "We intended to have a good slice of her's, but not a morsel of ours shall fall into her hands." Shall she have any money to pay her back part of what she has spent in the war? "Not a single franc!" cries French patriotism, wherever it breathes. "With the help

of England we have driven the last German regiment from our soil, and are we going to pay them for destroying our armies and burning our cities and villages? A thousand times, *no!*"

When England has heard this *no* reverberating through the whole area of France, what kind of *yes* would she be able to force upon the lips of the French Government and people? Let us imagine her predicament and language: "But you must pay Prussia something, in land or money, to reimburse her for all her blood and treasure spent in this war, which, you know, you forced upon her. We did not come over here to fight for you, merely or partly to save your money, or even all your land, but to save you from having all the breath beaten out of your body as a nation; to save your national existence from destruction; to set you on your feet again, to walk with us as a coequal power. We did not come here to bar the payment of your just debts to Prussia, which you rushed into against our urgent advice and remonstrance."

Now let us hear France: "Call you this backing your friends? Why, you are confederate with Prussia in our humiliation and dismemberment. After all this show of help and friendship; after having aided us to drive her forces out of France, you talk of giving her the territory which she seized but could not hold! You talk about our paying *her* costs in this war as well as our own! *O Albion perfide!* and all this after the magnificent triumph you have helped us to achieve!"

Now if the armed intervention of England could do all that its friends could conceive or wish, in what way could this most hate-breeding cause and question between her and France be averted? The friends of this "vigorous policy" seem to make it England's duty alone to interfere in behalf of France; and reproach her for considering money or blood in face of her obligations to her neighbor. In discussing her means for war, they intimate that she has plenty of money to hire soldiers abroad, if she cannot raise them at home. Let us grant this; but I would put it to every intelligent and patriotic American between the two oceans: Does England owe more to France than we do, as an ally, as a friend, a helper in the infancy of our nation, when at the point of being strangled in its cradle? Do we, can we pay our debt to her by these cheap and windy expressions of platform sympathy and type-talk about "old associations," and all that sort of thing? Littlest and meanest of all, can we pay what we owe her in the brassy and costless coin of reproach dashed into the face of England for her inability or hesitation to pay *our* debt as well as her own to her neighbor in this time of need? I would not lower the dignity and gravity of this argument by an illustration which might

excite a smile for its rusticity; but when considering this cheap process of asking such a creditor as France to "to take the will for the deed," I am reminded of the saying of a poor but friendly man to his neighbor:— "O Sam; I am so glad to see you! I would give you some cider, if I had any, and good cider too." To a man with parched lips this cheap though sincere will must give increased thirst.

Suppose, then, that the friends of this *vigorous policy* should feel the pulse of the American government and people on the question, not only of England's duty but of our own to France. Suppose they address an appeal to Congress to show more magnanimity and higher sense of obligation to her; to set aside all the love of money, life, and comfort which England has evinced, and send over to the rescue of France our whole navy and an army of 50,000 men under General Sherman. Perhaps with the help of the British Provinces we might muster ships enough to convey such a force across the ocean; especially if England would furnish cannon, horses, forage, and other munitions of war at a fair price, or without price. With such coöperation, she might shake off her "apathy" toward her distressed ally and furnish an army of 100,000 to march side by side with the American contingent. Or if they think this would be impracticable, let them urge the argument they press upon England; or say that we, too, have plenty of money; and if we cannot send an army across the ocean, we can hire and officer one there, and save Paris and France itself from subjugation. Surely the high-minded, generous American people would not haggle or hesitate over only a thousand millions of dollars, more or less, in behalf of a country to which we owe all that one nation can owe to another. England would have to expend that sum if she went to the help of France. Surely we owe France as much as she, and can afford to pay as much in money or blood, or both. Let the friends of armed intervention, who have such clear and brave perceptions of England's duty to undertake it alone, put fairly and squarely before the government and people of the United States the proposition to send to the succor of France such an American contingent in men or money as we have suggested. Let them ask honestly, earnestly, and in good faith, and without delay, and see what answer they will receive.

A New Way to Pay Old Debts.

I am no politician, and I read the leading organs of public opinion with equal interest. However they differ on subjects of home and foreign policy, I have been struck with a common feature of their views in regard to England's relation and duty to France at this crisis of the struggle between that country and Germany. In the first place, with all the history of our national existence before them, they seem to ignore our debt to France, or to regard it as a mere trifle compared with what England owes that distressed neighbor, who wrested from her the Thirteen American Colonies perhaps twenty or thirty years before they could have won their independence by their own unaided efforts. Or if they recognize any obligation on our part to France, they seem to imply that it may be fully liquidated by the cheap currency of a wordy sympathy, but that England must be held to pay her debt in the hard cash of blood and her people's earnings to save her neighbor's money or landed estate.

Then there are other aspects of the arguments urged by them which they can hardly consider. They seem to make our geographical position a moral virtue, or a kind of distinctive institution of our Republican government. I wonder if they ever think of the inference that dispassionate minds draw from this argument: that "distance lends enchantment" and solution, too, to our national obligation to France; that nature pays our debt to her by interposing the ocean between her shore and ours; that she is too far off to be helped by our navy and army; that our war-ships have too much business in antipodean seas to be spared for the aid of France, or to "pay for a dead horse." Surely those who press these arguments cannot believe that the $10,000,000 or $12,000,000 worth of arms shipped by our manufacturers or jobbers are an instalment of the debt we owe her; for every one of them costs her the full factory price, if no more.

There is another inference, very singular and very salient, that strikes one in the very front of these arguments. It is this: that though we are bound to keep out of or withdraw from all entangling alliances of debt to a foreign nation, England has no right to do the same; no right to be like us, to adopt our home and foreign policy; no right even to approximate to us in her institutions, to reduce her standing army to the standard of ours, though ours has a continent to defend while hers has only a small island, on which all the Powers of the continent could not land 100,000 men if they should unite in the attempt. No—so the argument runs—she must raise and sustain a great army that shall cope with the hosts of

any continental Power, and be the first and foremost in any great war in Europe, while we stand by and boast that we are the first and foremost in peace by virtue of our genius as a republic.

But the most remarkable and prominent feature of all these arguments is the direct suggestion of a new way to pay old debts, or to "kill two birds with one stone." Perhaps it is fair and right to say that the public journals and speakers that taunt England with love of money and love of human life as the reason of her hesitation to fight for France, do not in the same article or speech suggest how she could be forced to pay her debts all round. But in collateral arguments they do this very distinctly. In the first place, according to their logic, in fighting for France, England would not only pay her own debt but ours, too, to her neighbor and former ally. Although, of course, she never did and never can owe France as much as we do, yet, as she is the nearest debtor, she ought to pay what she owes and we, too, cost what it might. Now, if we could drive her into such a war, it would be a cheap as well as new way to pay an old debt, which we have acknowledged time and again. If we could force her into this armed intervention by dint of taunts and flings at her selfish love of peace, we should do as much for France as if we ourselves sent a fleet and 50,000 men to her aid. Then should we not pay our debt to France handsomely?

But another consideration seems to peer over all others in favor of this economy. It even improves upon the proverb of "killing two birds with one stone." It proposes to kill three or four at least. We shall not only compel England to pay what we owe France, but to pay us in full tale for all the damage her Alabamas did us. Nothing can be more direct and outspoken than the intimation that England would have to settle our claims more nearly on our own terms, even if she drew her sword for France under the pressure of American sentiment and influence. Our leading journals, of both political parties, reproduce this consideration almost daily. Near the conclusion of this letter, I glanced at the most widely circulated and influential Republican journal in America, and read these lines, leading a paragraph on the subject: "The present time of embarrassment in England appears a very good opportunity for America to settle her old claims. England betrays much anxiety to arrange with us before plunging into greater complications in the East." The first and foremost of these complications is the intervention in behalf of France, to which a combined force of English and American opinion is urging her. The working-men of England, who are pressing her in this direction, in their address to their brethren in the United States, are afraid we shall

improve this "very good opportunity" to recover our bill of damages from her while she is paying our debt to France. Speaking of her hesitation to engage in such a war, they say: "To excuse this culpable inaction on the part of English statesmen, it is said that they are hampered by the fear that America will take advantage of England's position, if she went to war, and endeavor to enforce disputed claims connected with your late unhappy civil strife."

Thus this new way of paying old debts seems to be understood both at home and abroad as the direction our policy is to take in regard to this great question. It is a very adroit and ingenious policy. It kills three birds at least with one stone. What an attractive scope and motive for grandiloquent sympathy with France! What a heroic *rôle* for a great and generous nation owing what we do to her! If we can press England into a war for her, while she is clutching with the foe we will pounce upon her back with a score of American Alabamas. She will fear this act of heroic hostility on our part and postpone the intervention we are trying to force her into until she has paid us what we demand. Under such a pressure of embarrassments she will not haggle over the amount. We shall get our pay in full from her, and we shall pay our debt to France in full in the money and blood of England. The animus, aim, and end of this economy bespeak a shrewd policy; but, on the whole, I wonder if the American nation would be proud of its adoption and success.

The Conquering France of the Future, and the Way to Her Victories.

At this moment of physical disaster to France, when the sympathies of the outside world, in both hemispheres, are flowing in upon her in a flood of good-will, the question as to her future must come to every thoughtful mind susceptible of a friendly interest in her well-being. No nation in the history of the world ever drank of such a bitter cup of experience in one-half year as that now pressed upon her lips. The peoples that stand by can almost taste, if not share the draught. Even the new and powerful empire that has forced it upon her knows and feels how bitter it is. As she puts it to her lips she turns her despairing eyes from one bystanding nation to another for a look of sympathy, for a hand of comfort, in the supreme agony of her distress. What shall they say and do? What kind of hand shall they put forth to fold in hers, so weak and tremulous

with this tremendous struggle? Shall they tell her, in the midst of the black desolations smoking with her best blood, to arise from the ground and gird up her loins for another trial of the sword when the fatherless sons of her fallen shall be able to wield it? Shall they by one act, or word, or look of condolence, suggest or admit that she has lost one inch of her great place or one iota of her moral power in the world in this contest of brute forces? No; a thousand times, no! A city set upon such a hill as Paris, so far as the heart of its best vitality is concerned, cannot be hid, cannot be bombarded nor captured. The great lamp of its science and civilization that has lighted benighted nations and guided them through the dark of barbarism to the morning of an enlightened life—that lamp is hung too high to be reached by Krupp's mortars. In the best realm a nation can own, France has yet an empire unbounded by the Rhine, the Don, or the Volga, and no one but herself can excide an Alsace or a Lorraine from this dominion.

This terrible conflict and its issue, and other events of almost equal importance, have brought the civilized world to the appreciation and balancing of other powers than those brute forces that have so long shaken the nations with violence or alarm. They are beginning to consider the spiritual place and power of the Pope as divested of civil or secular sovereignty. Even the most decided Protestant peoples can and do agree that it would immeasurably enhance the dignity and influence of his position if he should lay off from the majestic robe of his spiritual royalty the fustian scarf of temporal dominion. What they and all other outside nations say to the Pope let them now say, with equal force of argument and illustration, to France in this unprecedented crisis in her existence. Let them say to her, not in the patronizing tone of humiliating sympathy, not as to a fallen and humbled nation, "Put off from your regalia this gaudy Napoleonic figment of military glory. It dims the lustre of the best jewels in your diadem. It is to your best sovereignty what the wooden sceptre of civil power is in the right hand of the Pope. Go up and sit and reign on that higher throne which no usurper nor rival can shake or reach—the throne of that intellect and infinite genius to which the whole world pays you admiring and willing tribute. *In hoc vince.* In this high place of power you may say again, and say forever: *Veni, vidi, vici.* No Rhine, nor Pyrenees, nor sea, nor ocean shall bound this dominion of your mental vitality and might. The brute forces of all the outside world shall do soft and silent homage to this your great realm of moral power."

If this be a turning point, a decisive crisis in the life of France, it is one of almost equal moment to all the other nations of Christendom. They

have not only to consider her future, but to determine their own; and theirs is bound up in the same bundle with her destiny. Universal civilization for a generation is involved in the programme they plan for this year's action. What is the *rôle* they propose for the two closing decades of the century? Is it the one that has blackened France and Germany with the desolations of this bloody war; that has furrowed their lands of sunny green with the red-hot ploughshare of ruin, and strewn them with a million graves, and sown them with the Dead Sea salt of millions of human eyes weeping over them? Are there no voices coming up out of this black night of woe to reach the council-tables of cabinets to plead against a new history of human slaughter?

During all this tremendous conflict the eyes of the world have been fixed upon England. What she ought to do and could do for her nearest neighbor and ally has been discussed with vigorous freedom on both sides of the Atlantic. Whatever decision the public mind has reached on her duty and ability during the war, there is now a part for her to act for France which she owes to her, to herself, and to civilization. There was a time, if not in this war, when she ought to have "stood by her ally." There was a time—and it has gone to the ineffaceable records of history—when Louis Napoleon invited the Powers of Europe to a Congress of Nations to arrange for a proportionate and simultaneous disarmament, in order to lift from the peoples the increasing and crushing weight of that preposterous armed-peace system which has so long endangered their safety and consumed their revenues. If England had stood by her ally in that effort as faithfully as she did in their joint wars, France to-day might have been free from the footprint of a foreign foe, and Germany without a widow to mourn this bloody conflict. The poet has not exaggerated the sadness of the reflection, "It might have been." Let the dead past bury that with all its forgotten things. It might have been—what might not have been?—for the good of mankind and the glory of our race, if a single rivulet of opinion had run the other way at the council hour that decided the attitude and act of a great nation. Surely, if such a nation has a conscience, and the moral sensibilities of a human memory, England must remember, over the red and smoking desolations of France, how she declined her invitation to a Congress of Nations, to reduce those huge standing armies that have wrought, as the end of their training, these horrible destructions. Before and above all other nations England is bound by every obligation of honor, of duty to herself, to the ally prostrate and bleeding on the altar of the armed peace-system, and to the whole world and its future, to come forward and take up the proposition

of Louis Napoleon, and press it upon the Powers of Europe with all the moral force of her influence. With all the humiliations that have fallen upon France, it would be more cruel to her spirit than any she has suffered if England should wait to have her ask with her own lips and in her own behalf for a reduction of the armed-peace establishments of the other nations to the footing of her own reduced abilities. To put upon her this cruel necessity would be the unkindest cut of all upon the sensibilities of her nature. To spare her this bitterest draught of humiliation is England's *rôle* and duty beyond the obligation of any other Power. There are more urgent considerations pressing upon her to initiate this measure than upon any other nation. Some of these it may be as well for us to suggest as for her to remember.

No other nation in Christendom has said, paid, fought, and bled so much for the maintenance of a balance of power as England. A balance of what kind of power? Of wealth, genius, learning, manufacturing skill and production, capacities of commerce, acreage of territory, or increase of population? No; not one of these powers is meant to be put in the scales. Nothing but the balance of brute forces, of the most brutish kind, is embraced in this old policy. How has she been able to make the beam lie level in her favor? By hiring the brute force of other countries to put in her scale when her own weighed less than the brute force of France or Russia, or even young America when it was just out of its cradle as a nation. It is because she has done, sacrificed, and suffered more than any nation to effect and preserve a balance of power that we may urge her to prosecute the policy or its principle in the inverse direction. That is, balancing these brute force powers by leveling them downward. There is a mathematical verity which even the German emperor, who claimed to reign above the rules of grammar, would not have dared to controvert. It is this: "If from equals you take equals the remainders will be equals." No nation in Christendom has even more self-interested reasons than England for inducing the great Powers to apply this mathematical truth to their armed-peace establishments. She is at this moment at work with all the energies of her alarm and ability, endeavoring to keep the beam of these brute forces even by leveling up; by arming the whole island, cap-a-pie, against some giant invader. And all this increasing armament gives her no sense of peace or safety. She will never attain to that sentiment until she renews virtually the proposition of Louis Napoleon, or convokes a congress of nations to apply Euclid's verity to their policy. Cannot a very child in reasoning see how it would work, as well as what it means? "If from equals you take equals the remainders will be

equals." That is the way he puts it on the blackboard for school-boys; and they might put on the council-boards of cabinets in this way: "If you take equal halves from your armed-peace establishments the remainder halves will be equal." That is clear to any boy's understanding. Does not this keep the beam of the brute forces level? Does not this preserve a balance of power? Would not this policy defend and assure England better than any coalition she can enlist or subsidize against this new Germany or Russia? Let her look at the programme of her own political future, for free and universal education of her masses, for universal suffrage, vote by ballot, for all the freedom and intelligence of opinion and action enjoyed by American citizens. How can she expect to keep up the balance-of-power *regime* except by this leveling-down principle? Can she ever raise an army, except in actual invasion, by conscription? Can she balance despotisms by borrowing their dead weights to put in her scale? Simultaneous and proportionate disarmament, then, is as great a necessity to England as to any Power in the world.

But if England owes it to her own peace, sense and condition of safety, and to her new political constitution to move without delay for this simultaneous disarmament, she owes it to France in the urgent obligation of honor as well as duty. When France arises to her feet again, how is she to balance these brute forces around her? With all her regular army destroyed, scattered, or demoralized, with half her navy transferred to her victorious foe, with ten milliards of francs to pay for her subjugation, besides her own expenses in the war and the interest of her old debt; with not even seeding for her soil, and with the very roots of her agricultural and other industrial interests burnt out, how is she to level up to the armed-peace establishments of Germany and Russia? If American opinion has any force or any useful work in the outside world, now is the time and the occasion to bring it to bear in favor of this general, simultaneous, and proportionate disarmament. This is the best mission in which it can be employed, and this is the best victory it can win for the France we owe so much, and for the civilized world we aspire to lead in the path of our progress. Have we not been writing and speechifying boastfully for half a century about the influence of our ideas and institutions on European nations? Have we not been predicting through all this period that they must approximate their systems to ours? Well, what part of their systems was most distant and dissimilar from ours? Let every American who has traveled in England, France, or Germany, answer this question, and, ten to one, he will say, it is their large standing armies in time of peace. Do we wish, even for the glory of our influence, as well as for

their good, that they shall approximate as nearly as possible to us in their institutions? Then we must induce or attract them to reduce their armed-peace establishments to the standard of ours. On this side of our system lies the nearest point of their approach to us. A Congress of Nations is an old American idea. The very sound of the term has the ring of all these united continental States in it. But when we associate the great object with it, the idea embraces a sublime significance to mankind.

The Per Contra of the Alabama Account.

With sincere respect for such officials before the bar to which they are trained, the court to which we must refer these claims is not an Old Baily tribunal, nor any American one, in which the *ex parte* or *nisi prius* argument of "a Philadelphia lawyer" is to carry the day. Nor is it to be held in the cabin or cave of that classic Sibyl whose leaves furnish such a rhetorical figure to the brilliant notions of justice and adjustment which many American writers and speakers seem to entertain. There exist for many important questions which can not be solved by technical law, courts of equity to adjust them between individuals. If such a court of equity be indispensable in a country full of laws and statutes designed to meet every case, how much more is such a court necessary to adjust a question between two great nations in the absence of any thing that can be called a definite, settled international law!

Whatever, then, be the form or process of adjudication—whether it be by a court of arbitration or by a conference of commissioners—the case between us and England must go to the bar of equity. And, to the credit of the American mind, I think we may say that no lower tribunal and no lower verdict would satisfy it. The pagan Sibyl's leaves are not the leaves of our account current with England in this matter. The mode of settlement they represent would not satisfy American notions of justice and equity. Suppose, for instance, England, wishing to settle the case satisfactorily to us, should submit it to a jury of twelve conscientious and intelligent Americans at Washington, before an American judge, and with only American counsel to represent and defend her cause. Let no one deem this supposition fanciful. For one, I believe the English people would be willing to have the case go to such a court to-morrow, and abide the issue. But what would be the process and issue? I would put it to every patriotic American to say if it would not make his cheek redden and tingle with shame if such a court did not bring to the case the loyal spirit and principles of impartial equity. The whole American nation

would be the most losing and dissatisfied party if full justice were not done to England in the presentation of her case, in the arguments of the counsel, in the charge of the judge, and the verdict of the jury. Any charge, suspicion, or consciousness of unfairness on their part, would smite the nation like a shame. But what would the nation expect at the outset of the trial? Unquestionably this—that Caleb Cushing, Mr. Evarts, and Judge Black, or whoever the American counsel chosen by England might be, should read up her case with diligent and honest care; that they should present and make a full and fair use of every fact and circumstance that should be admitted in her behalf. Nothing less than this and their best learning and eloquence in pleading her case would satisfy the American people, however they might desire the verdict to be in their favor.

Let us, then, suppose such a court to be summoned at Washington, and such counsel to be chosen by England, with such duties devolving upon them. Let any intelligent mind that remembers the historical detail, reflect upon the heads of the brief which this counsel would bring into court, or the items *per contra*. It is probable such a mind would turn to the first and most sensitive count of the indictment, or the animus of the English government and people, to see what could be fairly put in against that charge. I will not pretend to suggest the facts the learned counsel would adduce to meet this and all the other counts. But as no other living American had such opportunities as myself to become acquainted with the primary sources of English opinion during the war, I would like to indicate a few facts and circumstances which might be put among the *per contra* items.

First, then, as to the sentiment of the English nation towards us in the first two years of the war. I think the current American measure applied to this sentiment is not American in an honest, democratic sense. What is called the ruling or aristocratic class has been too often and too long regarded as the English nation that feels, thinks and acts, and determines the character and action of the government. Because a majority of this aristocratic class seemed to be against us, many of our writers and speakers, more sensitive to their opinion, yielded to the impression that the great masses of the English people partook of the same feeling of hostility to us. No impression could be more unfair. These great masses were with us and for us with a sympathy which equal millions of one country never before manifested towards the people and cause of another nation. Their clear and honest perceptions of truth and right operated like an enlightening conscience upon the whole public mind of England, even when it was not clear and certain to "the ruling classes" whether our struggle was a

war for emancipation or only for union without emancipation. Even in that unhappy period of doubt in regard to this great question, these honest-hearted masses held stoutly to their faith in the justice of our cause, and held England, as with a sheet anchor, fast against all the inside and outside influences that were combined to impel her into intervention. But was it only a sentiment by which they clung to the right and true? Far from it. For nearly four years they stood the siege of the cotton famine with a heroic endurance never paralleled before in human patience and continuance. Thousands upon thousands of them let every article of furniture and comfort go one after the other for food, and sat down silent in the ashes of poverty, nor bated one jot from their stout will against the intervention into which the Confederate States had counted upon starving the English nation.

On the sentiment count, then, I think the American public would admit, as a *per contra* item, these four years of suffering, during which more than 100,000 honest, patient Lancashire operatives had to be fed with charity soup—men and women, and even children, who would have been prouder to beg from door to door than to ask or permit the English government to furnish them cotton at the cost of its recognition of the independence of the Southern States.

Then, as an incidental circumstance, the fact might be admitted, to what little value it was worth, that no neutral nation ever suffered more pecuniary loss in its industrial interests from a foreign war than did England during the conflict in America. Of course this is comparatively a small and natural item of damage, but it may be worth mentioning as one of the circumstances upon which the Confederate States depended in counting upon English intervention. This large and continued loss was one of the influences she had to resist in breaking down their expectations. In this light it might come in with other *per contra* memoranda.

There is another fact, more salient and appreciable, which the American people must admit at no inconsiderable value, as a more tangible and patent proof of the general policy and animus of England toward us during the war. It is known now, better than at any previous time, that she not only resisted all the influence that her "ruling class" could bring to bear upon her, but all the urgent and persistent pressure of the French government in favor of intervention to establish Southern independence. Surely an American court of equity would admit this fact to the full value of its evidence.

Even in regard to the escape of the Alabama itself, though the English nation is ready, willing, and waiting, to pay the damage she inflicted on

our commerce, our own recent experience might well dispose us, and even make it good policy in us, to admit extenuating circumstances. We have had lately several cases, and we may have many more hereafter, to prove how our own government may be outwitted and bamboozled by blockade runners or privateers fitted out in the face and eyes of all our naval forces and authorities at Brooklyn. But no American who remembers the speech of Lord Stanley in Parliament will doubt that England is ready to admit her mistake in regard to the Alabama, and to pay what damage it did to us. I doubt if her counsel will institute the plea of ignorance of the character of the ship and its destination, or even plead the accident which, it is said, prevented her timely arrest, or the illness of the judicial officer who was directed to arrest her. But while we do not admit this plea of ignorance or accident to bar our claim for full damages, we must concede that when England did get her eyes open to these adroit and elaborate deceptions on the part of the Confederates and their sympathizers, she did take efficient and costly steps to prevent the sailing of other and more formidable ships built to break as well as run our blockade. There were the two tremendous rams, with their Turkish names, constructed by the Lairds at Birkenhead, as if for Turkey or some other oriental Power, but really designed for Charleston or Mobile as blockade breakers. There was no positive evidence of their destination, no positive attempt at an aggressive act; so the English government, to prevent the possibility of such an act, bought them in as for its own service. Then there was its lawsuit in regard to the Alexandra, another suspected privateer. These cases may be admitted for consideration at least, to guide the course of our government in analogous circumstances.

Undoubtedly the utterances of English orators and writers stung American sensibilities more deeply than the money lost by all the ships sunk by the Alabama. But the bark of a Roebuck, who likened himself to the dog Tear'em, should not drown the voices of such defenders of our cause as John Bright, W. E. Forster, Thomas Hughes, and hundreds of other noble men who stood by us in the severest crisis of our struggle with a power and eloquence of advocacy which should entitle them to the grateful and everlasting memory of the American people. These are the men that represent the majority of the English nation—the great masses of the people who stood so true to us through the conflict. Let the eloquent arguments of Bright, Argyll, Forster, Hughes, Mill, and other statesmen, and the more eloquent though silent sufferings of a million of patient operatives in our behalf, be admitted to a place in the *per contra* memoranda.

The last fact I will suggest for such a court of equity, is the noble and

illustrious life which Richard Cobden sacrificed for our cause. In all human probability he would have been alive to-day to enrich his country and his age with the wealth of his character if it had not been for his devotion to the justice, truth, and freedom involved in the American conflict. Indeed, one might almost believe he saved his strength and voice to plead our cause in the House of Commons. I think the last time that his persuasive voice was heard in that House was in our behalf. I happened to be present on that occasion, and on sitting down he accidentally recognized me in the Speaker's gallery, and came and spoke to me in that old familiar way, so genial, and cordial, and simple. I tried to thank him as well as I could, as an American, for standing by us through evil and good report so nobly. It was the last time I ever saw him alive. The weather, which was exceedingly severe, aggravated the old ailment which his arduous labors had revived, and he retired to his country residence at Midhurst, to rest and recover strength. Before he had improved much the American question came up again in Parliament. The weather was still unrelentingly bitter, and his voice was weak and his strength low. But he could not refrain from one more effort in our behalf. He started for London, hoping to be able at least to make a short speech. But on his arrival his old ailment had come back upon him with such violence that he had to be driven to his lodgings instead of the House of Commons, and there he laid himself down and died, virtually for our cause. His life was worth much to the world as well as to his own country. It was worth much to us, and he laid it down for us in actual sacrifice. That life let us admit into the *per contra* page in our reckoning with England.

The Eastern Question.

Russia from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint.

If any nation in the world is enabled and bound by its position to view the great questions that agitate Europe from a cosmopolitan standpoint, it is America. The force and value of our opinion on such questions depend upon this point of view. The moment we descend into the low arena of local interests and prejudices, we lay off the dignity of the umpire for the badge and bludgeon of the partisan. As the position of Russia is henceforth to become an exciting question to the Old World, we owe it to her, to ourselves, and to universal civilization, to form and utter our opinion from a higher level of consideration than the one assumed by the partisan powers of Europe. To ascend to this point of reflection will cost our national mind an effort in which it has never yet succeeded. The power of English opinion is so great upon us, say what we will; so much of our knowledge and conception of European matters comes to us through the English press and literature, that, in spite of our boasted independence of thought and action, our first views of European nations and questions become, almost mechanically, English. In watching this tendency of American opinion, one may see it in all our leading journals of both political parties. A few days ago a leader appeared in one of the most influential of them not only urging the ability, but apparently the duty, of England to ally to herself, or subsidize Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and raise an army of 400,000 men to oppose Russia's growth and march; or rather to prevent her from becoming, two or three centuries hence, as near a neighbor to England in India as she is now to France or America itself. Nothing could be more completely English than the whole argument of that article. It was perfectly English in its view of Russia, past, present,

and to come. It was as full of the old balance of power animus and theory as any Tory argument you could find in the Edinburgh *Review*.

Now the very worst thing we can do to the English people by our opinion, is to adopt and express theirs on these great questions; to justify and increase their panics and prejudices in regard to the character, and intent, or even ability of their neighbor nations. And if we really have an honest and loyal wish for her well being in the world, the best we can do to promote it, is to erect a fair, impartial opinion of our own, which shall serve to check her drift into these periodical fantasies of suspicion and alarm. Our opinion should be a harbor buoy, fast anchored in a firm holding, not a sham lightship, drifting with the same current that bears her toward a lee shore of disaster. The best that America can do for her, or any other European nation, is to establish such a moorage for her, and any other power driving out rudderless to the wild sea of war. But America must re-read, if she cannot stop to re-write, for herself the history and character of other peoples and governments, before she can anchor such a moorage of fair and independent opinion. She owes it to them to write their histories for herself, and from her own standpoint. This she will do some time or other; but, without waiting for that, she may read their histories as they have been written in the salient acts of their life and being.

Of all European histories the American mind has studied, not one of them, probably, has been read so completely through English spectacles as that of Russia. I think it is safe to say, that American opinion as to a foreign nation has never been so completely English as in regard to that Power and people. And this identity of view and sentiment is as hurtful to England as it is unfair in us. I am conscious that this opinion is so common to both countries, and so strong in each, that an American may be charged with political heresy if he ventures to view Russia from a fair, cosmopolitan standpoint. In attempting this, I do not wish to differ without motive from the authorities which the American public has so long accepted.

It is impossible to condense within a newspaper column the structure of an argument which requires for its development the space of a large volume. In such contracted limits the statement of facts must be bald, and the reasoning brief. Out of this necessity, then, I think, no fair and impartial mind, that has well studied the subject, will demur to the statement, that no nation in the world ever did or suffered more for civilization in the same space of time, and with the same means, than Russia has done. In the way of suffering, certainly no intelligent reader of history

will doubt the truth of that part of the statement. For several centuries she served as a breakwater against the barbarous and blasting hordes of Tartary, which else would have flooded the whole of Europe with their tyranny. But though she broke the flood that would have beat upon Germany, France, and perhaps England, she could not save herself from the ruinous inundation. Though it engulfed her for centuries, she absorbed it so that it did not spread farther west. In this long period of suffering for civilization—longer than the Egyptian bondage and harder to bear—the nations of central and western Europe had time and means to grow to the status and stature of independent governments and peoples. But their fairest historians have never recognized how much of their safety and growth in these centuries they owed to Russia, who braved and bore the worst dangers of them all.

But Russia has done even far more than she has suffered for the civilization of the world; and done more in the same time and with the same means, than any other nation, to that end. It is remarkable how rarely we find an English or American writer who measures her against other countries by these standards; who seems even to recognize how little working capital she had to begin with, and what she has accomplished with it. Indeed, she had to import into her realm the very seeds of civilization she possessed; or the few Scandinavian, German, Italian, Greek, and other foreign elements that she introduced. If all the enlightenment they produced were put in one lustre, it is doubtful if it would have made as much light as the single town of Salem could emit when St. Petersburg was founded. In this world's history did ever a sovereign feel and deplore so deeply the want of this working capital of civilization as did Peter the Great? How he apprenticed himself and his young nobles to common trades, in foreign countries; how he scoured those countries for teachers of every useful art and branch of instruction, is partially recorded in our school-books. From his time to this, no nation has been more teachable, or learned more from foreign instructors, and from the experience and example of other countries, than Russia. Then look at the heterogenous populations out of which she had to construct her empire. Begin at the Arctic sea and guage them through to the Euxine, and from the Baltic through Siberia to Behring's Straits. Apply a moral standard to their races, religions, and habits, not as they are now, but as they were when she took them under her sceptre. Was there any other Power in the wide world that could reach them with more of the elements or influences of civilization? On the whole, is not the world indebted greatly to her for what she has done for these barbarous popula-

tions? Consider how comparatively brief is the space of time that she has had them under her sway; and how in this period their old pagan idolatries and superstitions have been displaced for at least the nominal faith and worship of the Christian religion.

And now comes that great act and proof of advancing civilization, that emancipated her millions of serfs, and which makes them the freemen of the empire, to constitute that middle class to be what the emancipated serfs or *villians* of other countries have been to them. Did any nation ever surpass Russia in this single act of civilization? It is impossible for her to stop at this step. She must take others in the same direction. She is taking them rapidly and successively in every department of enlightenment and progress—in literature, in popular education, railways and all kinds of internal improvements. The Russia of Peter the Great is as dead as the England of the last Henry. The Russia of the next generation will not be the Russia of to-day, but a nation, if not abreast, at least not far behind the civilization of older and more favored countries. This is a fact in the future almost as certain as any in arithmetical or geometrical progression. And in all these anxieties and preparations for incoming events, this fact must be recognized and appreciated by those who consider them from a cosmopolitan standpoint.

The Commercial Relations and Capacities of Russia.

The geographical position and producing power of Russia qualify her for a great part to act for the benefit of the whole Eastern hemisphere. What Egypt was to Canaan and other countries in time of dearth, Russia is to western and southern Europe in seasons of short crops. Her granaries pour forth a steady abundance that countries under famine cannot exhaust. What their stores of grain are worth to them in such a time of need, no nation knows better by repeated experience than England. What could she have done for Ireland, even with America to draw from, if she could not have had Odessa and other grain ports of the Black Sea to go to? Now that railways and other facilities of transportation are progressing so rapidly, they will become more and more the granaries of Europe, which will supply its teeming populations with cheaper bread than they can grow at home. Every year Russia's producing power will become a more vital necessity to England and other countries of western Europe. This she

and they are coming to recognize more and more distinctly. Their vital or material interests, more truthful and reliable than their political instincts, have and feel an immense stake in all the railways and internal improvements in Russia that tend to increase this producing power, and to make it more accessible and available to them. In a word, they want to bring Russia *nearer* to them; and with one hand they are lending her money and helping her to this end, while with the other, or political hand, they are trying to push her up against the icebergs of the frozen ocean.

But grain is only one of the productions which Russia supplies to western Europe. Her iron, flax, hemp, tar, and turpentine are increasing and indispensable necessities to them. In the Crimean war the Irish linen manufactories would have stopped, and Ireland would have suffered a flax famine as severe as was the cotton famine to England, if it had not been for a supply of the raw material imported at the enchancement of 50 per cent. through Prussia. Every ship in the British navy that thundered in the Black Sea or Baltic, showed its sails and cordage of Russian hemp, and every rope hardened with Russian tar. In spite of all orders in council or proclamations to the contrary, England imported during the war nearly as much from Russia as in time of peace, and paid nearly twice as much for it. Indeed she could not carry on the war without commercial help from her enemy.

But with all these vital or food-relations to the rest of Europe, with all that Russia is commercially now, and is to be to the largest division of the human race, it is distinguished over all other large regions of the globe by one remarkable physical characteristic. It is virtually a riverless empire. It is full of rivers great and small, but either they run to no ports of her own, or they are worthless for commerce. Those that flow into the northern sea are frozen up half the year, and cannot be counted. The narrow straits that connect lakes Ladoga and Onega can hardly be called rivers. The only one really that Russia may call her own in Europe is the Dwina, with the port of Riga at its mouth; and that is inaccessible and unavailable during the winter months. I would earnestly commend to the reader a few minutes' study of the map of that vast and important empire. Aside from the subject under notice, he must be struck with a peculiarity unparalleled in any region of the globe of equal extent. He will see that the old proverb, "rivers to the ocean run," is not true of Russian rivers, or seas either. Count the rivers that run into the Black Sea. They are many and large, but none of them really debouch in Russian territory. To appreciate this singular circumstance we must apply to it an easy standard of measurement. Imagine, then, a great bayou in the Mississippi just below Vicks-

burg, of the dimensions of the Black Sea. Imagine all the rivers in the United States, from Maine to Texas, to run into this salt water bayou, and that all the commerce that floats on those rivers has to pass through that short length of the river that connects the inland sea with the Gulf of Mexico. Then realize, if you can, that this short and narrow strait is called the Bosphorus, and that New Orleans is Constantinople, and that all the commerce of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains that finds its way to the Atlantic, has to pass between the forts of a foreign nation, of a race, language, and religion as alien to us as any pagan people can be. Then in the north we have the St. Lawrence, and we can get out to the ocean that way except in the winter, when Quebec becomes a Riga to us. It must be very difficult for an American mind to imagine our great country subjected to such conditions, not by nature, but by dynastic arrangements that are in open and incessant war with nature. But this illustrates the commercial position of Russia almost to the smallest detail of its character. Just consider this fact for a moment. With all the extent of her empire, and with all its productive power, she has not a single port of her own in Europe that is open all the year round.

While the map is in your hands, just glance at the Russian territory in Asia, and see how its rivers and seas are isolated worse still from the world's oceans. See what long rivers run northward into the Arctic ocean, or the Obi, Yenisei, Lena, and others. But what is their commercial worth to the world? Look the other way, and see the length and course of the famous Volga and Ural. These fall into the Caspian, a warmer sea; but they might as well run into our Lake of the Woods, so far as ocean connection and commerce are concerned. Five minutes' study of the physical geography of the Russian empire will impress any fair and intelligent mind with an approximate sense of the bars and embargoes which nature has imposed upon its commerce with the rest of the world. This sense will prepare one to appreciate the bars and embargoes which a coalition of suspicious and jealous Powers is endeavoring to add to those nature has imposed, or to aggravate and perpetuate them.

If England, France, or Prussia had been in Russia's place, either of those Powers, a hundred years ago, would have possessed itself of the right of way to the Mediterranean, as we did to the Gulf of Mexico, and by more forcible means. Would England have tolerated such a condition a single year? Would she have suffered a Turkish Constantinople at the mouth of the Thames, and her ships to pass to and from the sea between the forts of a Mohammedan Power? But this is the very condition for which she has poured out so much precious blood and treasure to fasten forever upon

Russia. This is the prime object aimed at in all these leagues, coalitions, and conferences against that country. And these allies, when they wrestled her to the earth, and put their feet on her neck for her suspected attempt to break this condition, charge her with treachery for attempting or purposing again to throw it off after they had fettered it upon her anew as she lay exhausted on the ground. And, *mirabile dictu*, *Anglicised* American opinion sides mechanically with theirs, and approves their coercion.

What does "neutralizing" the Black Sea mean, as stipulated in the Paris Conference, after Russia had been overpowered by the four allied Powers that pitched into her in behalf of *civilization*? It means in plain and honest English, a perpetual blockade of the Russian navy in her frozen ports in the North Baltic. It means that none of her war ships shall ever get into the Mediterranean or the Atlantic except by the roundabout way of the Cattagat and Skagerack. It means that they shall never be allowed to enter the Mediterranean except under the British guns at Gibraltar. And does any other nation load more ships for the world in that sea than Russia? And what is the reciprocation, or the equivalent, conceded by the allied Powers for this blockade? This, that they will not send their ships of war into the Black Sea in time of peace! That is all. They might as well promise that they would not send them into Lake Ontario. The Black Sea is not on the road to any other country than Russia, any more than Lake Ontario is to any other country than ours. If they go there at all in peace it is to menace or admonish Russia; if in war, it is to attack her.

This, then, is but a glance at the physical position and the commercial capacities and relations of Russia. It is a mere peep over that structure of fanatical suspicion and jealousy by which western Europe is trying to bar her way to the seas they claim and use without restriction; to compress her growth; to weaken and thwart her civilizing power; to shut her away from any new points of contact with the more enlightened world. Now it is in regard to the animus and aim of this policy that America is in duty bound to form and express a fair, dispassionate, independent opinion of her own. I would fain hope that the preceding and succeeding facts and reflections may induce at least a few intelligent and thoughtful minds to review, and, perhaps, correct the impression they have hitherto entertained in regard to the "Eastern Question."

Russia as a Political Neighbor and Power.

We have considered some of the aspects and characteristics of Russia as a civilizing, producing, and commercial power. These have been presented from a cosmopolitan stand-point, or that point of view which, we may hope, the American mind may be yet trained to adopt when forming an opinion on these European questions that are agitating the Old World. An American opinion, unanimous, clear and vigorous, uttered from such a high level of reflection, is the only leverage of our moral power on the issue of these questions. And England is now and must ever be our *point d'appui* for this leverage. If we move the European world for its good by our opinion, it must be by its force on the public and governing mind of England. Until the tongue she and we speak shall become the universal language of Europe, she is the only nation, as it were, that leans on our bosom, puts her ear to our lips, and her fingers to the pulse of our sentiment. If it can be made to beat, and breathe, and speak as it should, it will do more than any other moral influence in the world to break the spell of those periodical fanaticisms of suspicion and alarm which have so often plunged her, and other nations with her, into aimless and calamitous wars, and which are now again threatening her and them with heavier disasters to civilization. No other living American can have greater cause or desire than myself to contribute what little influence he can to the formation of an American opinion that shall work this immeasurable good to her, and through her to the rest of the world. If any intelligent Englishman, in his own or in this country, shall happen to notice these reflections, I believe he will recognise in them a fair and generous spirit toward England, and an earnest and loyal desire to promote her well-being, even in the strongest phrases and statements of the argument.

There is no other Power in the world that is now and ever will be such a close, conterminous neighbor to so many nations as Russia. Indeed, until we bought her estate in America, her empire extended through three continents, and abutted upon countries of almost every race, and language, and government on the globe. For a hundred years or more, she has been almost a universal neighbor, or one to European, Asiatic, and American nations. And now I would ask any thoughtful, reading American or Englishman to bring his political theodolite and level, and take the altitude, or the right ascension or declination of any people bordering upon Russia, and see if they have been lowered

one iota by their proximity to her. Take Sweden, for example. She may be called Russia's nearest neighbor, or nearest to her right arm of power. Has that small nation suffered in its interests or institutions by this neighborhood? With all the blood and treasure England has poured out for Spain, and with all the protection she has extended to that country, has it lived a freer or purer political life than Sweden has done, almost encircled by the right arm of Russia? Follow her boundary line west and south, from the mouth of the Neva to the mouth of the Amoor, and see if you can find a people that has been depressed by her near neighborhood. Poland, who invaded and half subjugated Russia for many centuries, died of heart disease, like the republic of Venice; and all the doctors in the world could not keep her alive and whole as a nation, because she rent herself asunder in the convulsions of her malady. And, we may say in passing, there is more hopeful life in each of the three parts than there was in them all when a factious, discordant, and corrupted whole. Look at Prussia, from the time she was a small duchy to this day of her mighty empire. She has abutted upon Russia for the whole length of her eastern boundary in the most naked proximity, with not even a Rhine between them. Has she been put back in the development of her political or educational institutions by this near neighborhood? Has her political life been chilled at its pulse by the frosty breath of Russian despotism? Look at Turkey. Have the masses of the people of that country suffered in their political, religious or manhood rights by the neighborhood of Russia? Suffered! they owe it to her influence if centuries ago they had not sunk under Mahommedan fanaticism to a depth of degradation and oppression that no serfs nor helots of any other country or age ever reached. *Suffered!* Why, the Jews under Roman or Assyrian rule never had greater occasion or longing for their Messiah to come for their deliverance, than have the Christian populations of Turkey for the coming of Russia to Constantinople, to break such a yoke of bondage as the Jews never wore, even in Egypt. What was Nebuchadnezzar, or Darius, or any Roman emperor, or Pharoah himself, to the Jews compared with what the Turkish sultans have been to the Christians of their realm, numbering two thirds of their population? Now, if never before, the universal American mind ought to have learned that golden rule of democratic arithmetic that counts in the census of a nation every human being in it, of whatever color, condition, race, or religion. We are doing that now with the millions lifted from slavery into our great and free peoplehood. Russia is doing the same with the millions of her emancipated serfs. The time then has come

when America will sin against her own soul if she longer follows the sentiment of Western Europe, and refuses to recognise the large Christian majority of the inhabitants of Turkey as the Turkish nation. Such a sin will be doubled in guilt and shame if she sides with any European coalition that shall renew the attempt to fetter that majority with new thongs of iron to the Mahommedan rule.

Who is afraid? What civilized nation has anything to fear from Russia's possessing her Mississippi to its mouth? What has mankind to fear in case that she should have the city of the Constantines, the centre of the old christian civilization of the world, as the fulcrum-point for the leverage of her civilizing power? Would that increase the proximity of her neighborhood to Sweden, Prussia or Austria? If she is such a dangerous foe to civilization, to her nearest neighbors; if she has been plotting to trample upon their rights and liberties, why need she wait until she gets to Constantinople to carry out her schemes? Would her army and navy be any nearer Sweden, Prussia, Austria, France or England at that point than at Cronstadt? But let us come to the very head and front of the suspicion that has so long dominated England and involved her in sacrific of blood and treasure. Would Russia be any nearer India at Constantinople than she is now? If any one thinks so, let him take the map and tell us the road by which she could reach India with an army more easily and speedily than by the road she owns and is on at this moment. Why, she is on the Caspian Sea now, with great rivers running through her territory into it. And that sea is nearer to India by thousands of miles, measured by facility of transportation, than the Mediterranean. Let any intelligent man consider the character of the country and the populations between the Caspian and India, and try to imagine the attempt of a Russian force to march upon Calcutta or Delhi. If such a force is not to go by land, and by this route; if it is not to bore its road through the Himalayas, or cross their heights of snow and ice, how is it to go by water from Constantinople? Just think of the attempt to pass a Russian fleet with 100,000 men through the Suez Canal. Let us suppose that Russia could build, borrow or hire 200 ships, half of which should be able to carry 1000 men each, and the other half arms, amunition, horses and forage enough for the whole force. Think of the insanity of putting these two hundred ships and all their armaments on that canal. Fancy them bow to stern midway in the narrow channel when a dozen men with their picks and shovels should cut the embankment and settle the whole fleet in the mud, with a row of masts three miles long standing up like a line of dead trees in the desert. Imagine the condition of such an army in this predicament, and the folly of exposing it to such destruction.

But if a Russian force could not go to India by land through or over the Himalayas and intervening populations, nor by water *via* the Suez Canal, how would the possession of Constantinople give it any additional facility to reach England's Indian empire, either by land or sea? It is evident there would be no new, shorter or better way by land. The only new way by sea would be *via* the Mediterranean, under the British guns at Gibraltar, and around the Cape of Good Hope; and that would be more dangerous than from the mouth of the Neva through the Baltic. But admit the possibility which excites this baseless fear. Suppose Russia could reach India, by sea or land, with a force equal to that which she sent to the Crimea in the desperate struggle with the four allied Powers. Certainly this admission must be as large as any intelligent Englishman could ask us to make. Well, what would a Russian army of 100,000 encounter on the frontier of India? Why, an empire containing a population three or four times as large as that of the whole Russian realm; an army outnumbering its own force by three to one; seaports of great capacity, full of ships: inland cities, in Scripture simile, "walled up to heaven;" a new and vigorous English nation in Australia, that would hear by telegraph the first footstep of a Russian soldier on the Himalayas, or on their southern slopes. To see such a nation as England subject itself to the bondage of such a fear as this; to see her pour out blood and treasure like water under the fantasy of these suspicions, ought to affect us, as her posterity, as the nakedness of Noah affected his saddened sons. All but one short century in the last thousand years of England's history is our history and our glory. We know she is brave. The red seals of her valor, like threaded brilliants, encircle the globe. Never did a nation face and fight the actual giants that offered her battle with stouter courage. Never did a nation so shake with fear before the impalpable spectres of fancy.

If England would say to us, in answer to this opinion: "Physician, heal thyself;" or, "put yourself in my place," we ought and are able to reply; "We have done both. We have never been attacked by such a fear of our neighbors. Ever since we have been a nation we have not been afraid of you, nor you of us, as to any invasion of each other's territory planned in time of peace. We have divided this continent with you from sea to sea. For hundreds of miles not a river or mountain separates us. In some cases the boundary line may run between the kitchen and parlor of the same house. The St. Lawrence is a northern Mississippi, with its immense bayous mostly on our side, while its mouth is in your territory. Your American family is one with ours in speech,

religion, and more intimate affinities. It would doubtless be a great advantage to them to cast in their lot with ours, and become a happy and influential part of one great continental nation. Perhaps you think so yourself; it is quite certain you believe we think so. Nor can you for a moment doubt our ability to make this territory part of our own, if we were so disposed. Then why do you not send an army of 100,000 men to defend your provinces against us? For this, and no other possible reason: you have an abiding confidence in our good faith and disposition. You believe us incapable of harboring such intentions as you impute to Russia, who has shown as little disposition to trespass upon your territory as we have ever done. What can be her motive and temptation to annex India across the Himalayas compared with ours to annex your American provinces, if it could be effected honorably to all parties? Then we would earnestly exhort you, for your best good, to concede to Russia a little of that confidence you repose in us. We can say this from our own experience; for we have proved her as a neighbor."

For twenty-five years, if no more, Russia has been a nearer neighbor to us than she could be to England in India, even if she were to-day at Constantinople. The treasures of California were as rich as any she could seize in India. When they were richest they were utterly defenceless. They were farther from our navy yard at Brooklyn or Norfolk than is Calcutta from Portsmouth or London. Two Russian frigates, each with a thousand men, from the mouth of the Amoor, might have captured San Francisco and all our Pacific settlements. We all knew that, but we never put an additional sloop of war on the Pacific for fear of such a Russian invasion. Why not? Because we believed her not only incapable of such an act, but also of such an intention. We had faith in her honorable disposition. We carried out in our thought that golden rule which should govern the deportment and disposition of nations toward each other: we believed that Russia would not do unto us what we would not do unto her. If we could inspire England with like faith in that nation and her nearer neighbors, it would work more for her peace and safety, and honor too, than all the coalitions she could organize.

Turkey's Value to the World.

It is a phenomenon in the moral world, which never before and never elsewhere had a parallel, that the great Christian nations that have poured out their blood and treasure in rivers for Turkey, feel and recognize most fully her utter worthlessness to civilized humanity and to herself. An English writer, a few weeks ago, who doubtless defended the Crimean war, and would urge his country to plunge into another for the same object, complains of the heavy bill of costs that falls upon the Christian nations of Western Europe to keep that Mahommedan power on its legs, or, rather, squatting on its Turkish mat, in time of peace. He says the annuity of sustentation that England, France, and other Christian countries pay for this purpose in loans has amounted to £10,000,000, or $50,000,000, for most of the years since the war with Russia. And this writer goes on, with an honest simplicity of wonderment, to inquire what has been done with the money; where and what are the railways it has built in Turkey; what are the public roads, internal improvements and useful and re-productive investments that can be shown for all this borrowed capital. There is Egypt, a little slice of a country, sandwiched between two deserts, and hasped to Turkish rule by the irons forged and fastened by Christian Powers. She has borrowed money too, on her own credit, which the Sultan wanted and claimed for his own purposes. But she has the Suez Canal to show as one of her assets in favor of civilization. But what great public works has Turkey to show for all the money that she has borrowed in England, France, Holland, and Germany, since the Crimean war, which was to galvanize her into the activity and progress of civilized life? To this question of the English writer let us add one more important and urgent still, and on the same line of reflection.

It is natural and right that the capitalists of the present day, and the nations to whom they belong, and whose wealth they disburse in foreign loans, should begin to inquire what Turkey has done with the money they have lent her. It is natural and proper that they should begin to look a little anxiously to see how all this hard-earned money of Christian industries and commerce has been invested; what practical, tangible securities it has produced; in a word, what assets Turkey would leave available for them if she should sink into bankruptcy under her protested paper. They know the Sultan would leave a lot of palaces, seraglios, harems, and many gewgawries of oriental luxury and dissipation; but what solid works and values could be placed in the inventory as her securities? It is pretty certain and clear what the results of an examination of the books of that country would be before taking an inventory of the available properties

left to its creditors. But if they find that all their lent gold was lavished upon the fantastic fripperies of the Ottoman dynasty, they will have this fact to remember, that their loans to Turkey were perfectly voluntary; that they took these loans with their eyes wide open to the character and habits of that government. If they are not satisfied as to the re-productive results of their *voluntary* loans, what has the civilized world to say as to the results of the *forced* loans that Turkey has levied upon it? For several centuries she has set herself down on the very bosom of the Old World, and stretched her limbs over the most ancient and sacred centres of its civilization and history—upon Jerusalem, Alexandria and Athens, upon Tyre and Sidon, and Smyrna and Damascus, as well as Constantinople, and other cities and centres of more modern times. Just feel the pulse of the moral and political life of every country and city on which one of the fingers, not to say a foot, of Turkey rests; then say and believe if you can that she is any thing less or else than a huge nightmare, lying right athwart the very breast of the world, chilling and stopping the circulation of blood between its head and feet. Is not the time of reckoning nearly come? Is it too early, after these sad centuries, for the Christian nations to take an inventory of Turkey's assets to humanity? to demand the results of its forced loans of so many capitals of ancient civilization? to inquire searchingly what they were when she laid her paralyzing hand upon them, and what they are now, and what they can be, under her rule? Let them do this fairly and honestly, and then see if, in face of all this history, they can unite in a new coalition to squander more precious blood and treasure to perpetuate her power and domination.

Neither the English nor American mind is ignorant or insensible as to the character of Turkey, and to the history it has made in the world. This has been taught and illustrated in the school-books of both countries, especially in this. Fifty years ago our geographies represented, in rude but graphic wood cuts, the only activities which have distinguished Turkey above the most barbarous nations. In these homely pictures she was seen busy at her first, her old, and only work. We children saw her sawing in sunder, breaking and mutilating the Corinthian columns of Grecian temples, as if the choicest and costliest monuments of civilization in marble were as hateful and dangerous to her bloody fanaticism as the great library of Alexandria itself. And, what is strange above all other moral phenomena of modern times, the crusades of the Middle Ages have been transformed by the ruling spirit of the ruling policies of Christendom. Once its thinly-peopled lands poured forth their armed hosts to rescue Jerusalem and the holy places, so precious to their religious faith, from the

clutches of Mahomet or of his possession and rule. Now, after six centuries more of the history of that rule, the greatest crusades these same Christian Powers can organize are in defense and perpetuation of the system;—as it were, to re-build the tomb of Mahomet over the sepulchre of Christ, and a Turkish harem over the holy home of His immaculate mother. The Crimean war was one of these crusades, and the four Powers that waged it numbered in their realms more souls than breathed in Europe in the time of Peter the Hermit. We are now threatened with another crusade for the same object. England, our self-blinded but noble mother, with more vitality of Christian life beating in her soul than in all the nations she summons to this crusade for the rescue of the crescent—England is making ready to lead again; to take the hard-earned bread from her children's mouths and throw it, soaked in their blood, to the dogs of another war for Mahomet!

Why? What is Turkey to England or England to Turkey, that she can rush foremost, and blindmost, into another crusade to prevent the Cross from superseding the Crescent at Constantinople—that old capital of Christianity? Our Webster's grand figure about England's morning drum beating a *reveille* around all the awakening continents is more than realized in her better missionaries of civilization, that sound the *reveille* of Christ's gospel in lands and tribes that never heard her war-drum. How strange and sad the fact!—that she should summon the Cross-bearing nations to an Armageddon, lest a Christian Power should remove the dead corpse that lies athwart the very highway of Christian civilization which she has labored for centuries to cast up all round the globe! Of all the discordant noises that war ever made on earth, none could so jar and drown the hopeful harmonies of human progress, or the consistencies of Christian policy, as the voice of England's war-trumpet sounding the charge of the Crescent against the Cross, lest this should regain its old capital and glory in the East.

Since this American Republic first had a being and a voice among the nations, no juncture in the Old World has arisen at which that being and voice could more fitly and effectually pay their debt to universal humanity, and to God's temporal kingdom on earth, than at this turning crisis of civilization involved in "The Eastern Question." It is localising and belittling this question to call it Eastern. It is a question of the whole world, involving the progress and interests of all mankind. In moral proximity, it is the nearest question of the Old World to us of this continent. In this sense we are fast becoming an Eastern nation, more eastern than England can ever be. Our Pacific shore and Asia's are being brought lip to lip.

Another decade will convey the intercourse and speech of near neighbors between them. We have more vital than material interests in this question. We have reason and motive to claim a right of way for our civilization westward through Asia via Constantinople. We have reason to urge, in behalf of humanity, that that old Pharos tower of Christian enlightenment, that so long held aloft its glorious lamp over the centre of the world, and over its middle centuries of progress, shall no longer stand, an extinguished lighthouse, to block and blacken the high road of Christian civilization across the hemisphere, to which it was once, and should be again, such a central and shining light. And we can wish and say all this without wishing ill or evil to Turkey. We have just learned, and other nations are learning, to number all the inhabitants of the national domain into the grand totality of its peoplehood, and to give the rule to its majority. The Ottoman dynasty and rule may die; it must die; and then only can Turkey begin to live; then alone can its great majority, its true peoplehood, shake off its fetters, arise to its feet, and walk erect the broad pathway of the Christian nations. In raising downtrodden millions to their feet for such a march, we have stood and wrought nearer to the side of Russia than to any other nation in the last decade. We may well rejoice, if we cannot share, with her in the uplifting of the great majority of Turkey to the political footing of other Christian peoples. And we may as heartily rejoice for, if not with, England at this consummation. No other nation could derive more good from it than she. The best service we can do her is to induce and enable her to see this with her own eyes. There is a condition from which no coalition ever can or ever will release her. She might as well hope to arrest the force and law of gravitation by "a foreign policy," as to avert that condition. Russia is now, and ever will be, her nearest civilized neighbor in Asia. There is a vast space yet between them. But let us admit her fear, and our hope, that this rough and savage interval shall be swallowed up in time; that Russia shall abut upon her northern line for its whole length. Would not the Russians be as good, peaceful and profitable neighbors as the Afghans, or any other tribes of similar character? Would they not buy as many of her goods, and make as much lucrative commerce with her as these uncivilized and costly customers? Would not Turkey under Russian rule, under a development that should raise from the dead cities and centers and populations buried alive under Mahommedanism, be worth to England ten times its present value?

It is time not only for England but for America to prepare for our mutual relations to Russia in the Oriental world. These three nations are to form an isosceles triangle which shall include most of Eastern Asia,

Russia's line already extends from Riga, at the mouth of the Dwina, across both continents to the mouth of the Amoor. England's line starts at an acute angle with Russia's in the northwest corner of India, and diverges eastward toward Southern China, and the world will not complain if it reaches the Pacific. The base of this triangle is the Pacific coast, including commercial China and Japan. The whole length of this base is now brought broadside on to our Pacific America. In all the years to come, we shall be nearer to that base than England, or even Russia. The ceaseless and increasing activities of our commerce, civilization and Christianity must penetrate and permeate it with a new life. Then have we not a national as well as a human motive and reason to urge England to desist from her old antagonism to Russia; no longer to kick against the pricks of a Providence that is shaping the great ends of humanity, including her own? It is not armed coalitions she needs to form, but enlightened and large-minded co-partnerships in spreading her own civilization over the world. Where can she look for partners for this great work in Asia? Is it not as clear as day that Russia and America are her only possible or practicable partners on that continent? Are they not partners with her there now by preoccupation?—and is not possession nine points in the law and motive force of that civilizing power which is to transform Asia? Would that our American mind could ascend to this high level of reflection, and then raise England's to the same standpoint; that they might look off together toward the morning of their great and common destiny and duty. They would soon see a light they never beheld before—a light that would reveal the darkness of those low-ground "foreign policies" which have cost the world so much blood and treasure.

General International Questions.

The Home Cost of a "Foreign Policy."

What does *progress* mean, as applied to the life, character, and movement of nations? The term is on the lips of the slowest of them as a watch-word. It is used to express and measure the total result of all the great steps and works of civilization. It does not stand as *Finis* does at the end of a book, written by a Carlyle or Macauley; not as an *end* at all, but as the conjunction *and* in an unbroken sentence; as a vital bit in the syntax of human achievements that links the immediate past with the immediate future; and more than this: that takes hold of the future and shapes it under its powerful and plastic influence and impulse. When the first steam-ship crossed the Atlantic against the *dictum* of a distinguished professor of science, the two nations that hailed the achievement did not write *finis* at the end of the voyage, but *initium;* not the conclusion but the beginning, and the hundred steamers that plow the oceans prove their faith and the fact on which it was built. All that these steam-winged fleets have accomplished or promised is expressed by the only word that could measure it—Progress. The electric wires that beat warm under seas and oceans with the pulse of sundered continents, bring mourning nations of both hemispheres around the coffin of a Dickens or a Peabody, or thrill them with the same hour's gladness at the news of a joyful event that touches the common sympathies and interests of all peoples. All these daily enacted marvels, overleaping in reality heights and depths imagination could not climb or sound in years young men may remember; all these feats of human thought and skill; the Suez Canal, the Mt. Cenis Tunnel, and all the other internal improvements and international works wrought in these last decades, are lumped together in the word *Progress.*

But all these prodigious acts and activities for the more intimate intercourse and material well-being of nations have not outrun nor outmeasured

their movements and efforts to advance the higher interests of their moral life and being. Take England, for example, during the last ten years. Look at the questions that have stirred town, village, parish, hamlet, church, chapel, and school, with vigorous discussion and activity of thought. These questions have related to the political, social and moral, and intellectual elevation of the great masses of the people; to the duty and necessity, and advantage of removing all those unjust and invidious inequalities which old laws and customs had created and perpetuated; in a word, to cut off the past in regard to this old hereditary condition of the people; to transform the *home policy* which had so long suppressed their manhood rights, and to put them on the same footing before the law, and by the law, as the citizens of the United States; on the same footing before the ballot-box, before the pulpit, and before the school-master's desk; to endow every English man, woman, and child with the same political, moral, and intellectual possibility and privilege that the American government could bestow or recognize.

Now in adopting this new domestic policy England had to change radically, if not wholly to abandon, the one she had pursued for centuries. Was it not her duty to adopt this new home policy? Did she begin too early? Has she carried it too far? Has she given it too much time, thought, and money? Did she not owe all these to her people? Have any outside Powers right to complain that she has been too much absorbed in these home matters? that she ought to have left her children to eat the crumbs that fell from the table of her wealth, while she gave its ample loaves to "*Foreign Policy?*" She did this last thing for centuries. Since this very one commenced, her foreign policy has cost her more money than she ever paid for the education and moral improvement of her people since she was born as a nation. And yet there are even American journalists and orators, of both political parties, who seem to reproach her with inconsistency in not adhering to her dead past; in not holding fast to the traditions of her old foreign policy. They almost taunt her with meanness and selfishness in neglecting or undervaluing her military prestige in the prize ring of the fighting Powers; in allowing a great war to take place in Europe without taking her old lead in it, whatever its object or origin. They seem to indorse the sentiment of a pugilistic Englishman, ndignant at his country's neutrality—"We ought to fight somebody." What did he mean by that expression? Just what they imply by reproaching England for her neutral attitude: that her first duty and dignity require her to look to her military prestige—as if that alone could preserve her high place, her first rank among the nations. Progress, in reference

to the home interests of her own people, or to her domestic policy, means radical change, almost complete transformation; but in regard to her foreign policy, progress should mean unswerving adhesion to the past—its unmodified perpetuation. Those who have read attentively the leading American journals, and the speeches of many of our leading politicians, must have been struck with these opinions, expressed or implied, in regard to England's attitude in the great struggle between France and Germany, and in other wars on the continent.

It is quite natural that an illustrious French statesman and historian, like Guizot, should adopt these views of a foreign policy. France never had a Washington of her veneration to enjoin upon her to "avoid entangling alliances" with foreign nations. Her foreign policy has always reversed this principle. Let us glance at one paragraph of Guizot's letter to Gladstone, and we shall see how fully and forcibly he brings out the idea that a foreign policy should have the first and largest place in the thoughts and acts of a powerful government; that the elevation of its own people is a secondary, incidental work, which may be attended to when there is nothing more important to be done abroad. He says:

"Although the voice of England is still heard in the discussion of the various difficulties which have for so long disturbed Europe, she has, little by little, ceased to consider foreign affairs as the principal object of her policy. Her thought and attention have been chiefly directed to civil administration and home interest, to the condition of the various parts of the British empire, namely, of Ireland, India and the colonies, and their relation to the mother country. She has initiated parliamentary reform, and modified judicial, ecclesiastical, commercial, and colonial laws, national education, and the police regulations. So that the government which was formerly considered the most obstinately conservative in all Europe has taken its place among advanced reformers. I am far from blaming this new direction of thought and civil administration in your country, and I do not question the value or special need of the various reforms which you have instituted. I am convinced that on the whole England is more equitably governed and more prosperous than she has ever been. But she should not and she must not forget that she owes the rapid development of her greatness and the impression of power which she produced on the whole world to her foreign policy for forty years. Is it possible that England now, in the midst of a great European crisis, can remain indifferent and supine without being accused of selfishness or pusilanimity, and speedily losing her political and moral influence throughout the whole world? Surely the events of the last few years in Europe, and the struggle between France and Prussia, which has resulted from them, are facts urgent and grave enough to recall the attention of England to her foreign policy, and to exert her most energetic efforts. A selfish policy, selfish even beyond the requirements of national interest, necessity, and right, is

that with which England is habitually reproached, and the reproach causes her quite as great a loss of influence as it does of moral honor."

No man in Europe knows better than Guizot the history of England's old foreign policy for the last forty or four hundred years. He knows well what it has been towards France, from the "Spanish Marriages" back through the wars of centuries. He knows, as well as any man in Europe, what foreign policies have been to the home policies of all its governments; how their own peoples have been victimized and bled at every vein of their manhood by them; how they have been the everlasting arguments and means for suppressing their civil rights; for postponing all improvement in their political and social condition, and cheating them with the sham of military or diplomatic prestige. The English people know well what was their civil state when their government was carrying out its foreign policy towards the first French Republic and the Empire that succeeded it. All that story lives and burns in unwritten tradition as well as written history. And what was the central and sole principle of that foreign policy? Hear Pitt unfold it in Parliament under, as it were, a death-bed pressure of honesty: "Unless the monarchy of France is restored, the monarchy of England is lost for ever." There was an object to fight for, and England fought for it with all the forces she could raise at home and hire abroad. To restore the Bourbon race and rule she paid Austria £3,200,000 for one campaign. Russia preferred to fight for her by the month instead of by the job, and she received of the hard-earned money of the English people £112,000 monthly for eight months work in the field. That was about the rate of wages she paid fighting Powers for helping her to carry out her foreign policy, and to acquire that military prestige which so many Americans, as well as Guizot, think she ought to maintain at all hazards. The cost of these hireling armies as well as her own raised the taxes on her people from £10,000,000 to £30,000,000 a year. This was only a small installment of the grand total; merely the little per centage which a speculator in real estate pays down in cash to secure a title to a large property bought on credit. England's foreign policy towards the American colonies and the French republic raised her national debt from £88,000,000 to £300,000,000 in a few years. From that sum it went up to over £800,000,000, seven-tenths of which, with rivers of English blood, were expended on the suppression of the French republic and empire, and on the restoration of the Bourbons.

These are some of the materialistic facts of one campaign of "a vigorous foreign policy." But it cost something more and dearer than money or even blood. It trampled under foot the eager hopes and aspirations of

the English masses for the civil rights and liberties won by the revolutions in America and France. It made treason of peaceful efforts to obtain them in England. It did worse than this. It demoralized the nation by setting on fire all the combustible materials of traditionary hatreds, jealousies, and the prejudices of race and religion which the wars of past centuries had engendered. 'If any one desires to see what kind of torch was applied to the train of these hateful and explosive sentiments, let him read Burke's "Reflections" and some of his speeches. Well, £500,000,000 of the English national debt are to-day the *unpaid* part of the cost of a foreign policy toward France alone. This sum is a great invisible but sensible vampire that spreads itself over every home in the British isles, and, like a bat with thirty million mouths, sucks the blood of every industry of man and beast in the realm. Before the leaders of this foreign policy were in their graves the nation had opened its eyes to the stupendous delusion. And there is no principle nor motive of intervention in foreign contests more utterly hateful to the English people than that carried out toward France. And no man knows this better than Guizot. Though no other nation, perhaps, is more susceptible of combustion than England when her latent prejudices and suspicions are kindled to a blaze by the Burkes of her Parliament or of her press, it does not require a new generation to see her mistake. In less than ten years after the close of the Crimean war the English people began to see and acknowledge that it was also a costly and lamentable blunder.

We come, then, to the question—"What was the foreign policy which England ought to have adopted towards France and Germany, at the beginning or at any other stage of the war between them?" Let us look at her ability to maintain that military prestige which so many American and European writers seem to think she ought to assert at any cost. Two facts will suffice to answer their arguments. England is the only nation in Europe that is obliged to *hire* her soldiers on the American principle. Never again can she draft or *conscript* them for foreign service. Then the converse of Lord Stanley's axiom is true. As no continental nation or coalition could possibly land in England more than 100,000 men with their armaments, so England could not land more than 100,000 men on the continent, even if she could raise five times that number by conscription. Now what kind of foreign policy would this military ability have enabled her to carry out in regard to the struggle between France and Germany? and when should such a policy begin to act? Could England have said to the two Powers confronting each other, each with 500,000 men, "There is to be no fighting between you; I will prevent it by force?"

If this were the foreign policy demanded of England, then it is quite clear that she would have had to invade France to prevent France invading Germany; that is, to have been the first to begin a war. Certainly no intelligent and honest American, Englishman, or Frenchman can say that she left any effort untried to prevent the war outside of this act or threat of armed intervention. In spite of all these efforts France rushed into the war with Germany, and four-fifths of both the American and English people looked upon it as an outrage, and hoped that she would get her deserts, or be obliged to suffer what she intended to inflict upon her neighbor. We will not pretend to inquire if she has suffered more than she intended to inflict, but ask at what crisis of her discomfiture England ought to have stepped in alone with her 100,000 men, or with the threat of them, and said to Germany, "It is enough; put up your sword, or I will force it into the scabbard." But suppose, as we have done heretofore, that this act or threat of armed intervention had arrested Germany at Sedan, what was the *ultimatum* that England could have imposed upon her, and the *maximum* she could have procured for France, in settling the damages of the war? These are some of the questions, as well as the costs, involved in that foreign policy which so many American and European writers and orators would impose upon England as an everlasting duty to mankind.

A Preliminary Congress of Juris-Consuls and Publicists.

This year must be one of the great years to mankind that determines the character of an age. The nations of Christendom have pursued a policy which has reached its legitimate issue in this tremendous struggle just closed. With this and other results of that policy behind them, they will come to a new point of departure at which two roads meet; one leading straight on in the old course, the other diverging to a new direction and to another end. The consequences depending on their choice of these directions are of immeasurable moment to the world at large as well as to themselves. Now, if ever, is the time for the friends of peace everywhere to concentrate their efforts to give the Great Powers that bias at this junction of the two roads that shall incline them into the one that leads them from the old highway of barbarism into the tranquil and happy realm of a better civilization.

What, then, can we do, by our organized efforts, as friends of Peace, to realize and hasten this consummation? Let us remember what we have

done in past years. Without asking help or counsel of any governments, we commenced a series of Peace Congresses on the continent at Brussels in 1848 which grew in power, and made a deep impression upon Europe. No such public meetings were ever held before in Belgium, France or Germany. At each successive congress men of the first eminence, ability and influence took a leading part in the proceedings. Among these were Cobden, Cormenin, Bastiat, Victor Hugo, Girardin, Baron Liebig, Suringar, Vischers, and other able men from most of the countries of Europe. There were principles and measures developed and pressed upon the Governments of Christendom which they must adopt if they move one step out of the old line of their course toward a condition of organized Peace. The congress of 1851, in London, was the most impressive and influential public meeting, probably, that any country or age ever saw ; not only for the character of the speakers and of their arguments, but for the representative capacity of the assembly itself.

These congresses organized by the friends of peace, and other enterprises which they have accomplished, may both suggest and answer the question ; "What else and more can we do?" Well, to begin with, we can do as much in 1871 as we did in 1851. We can take the field against this preposterous fanaticism of the armed peace system, which has just blasted the fairest lands of Europe, wielding new experiences, that shall plead, "like angels trumpet-tongued," against the stupendous folly. We can bring on in public assembly a discussion of that folly in sight of that great back-ground of woe, in the hearing of the wail of a million of widows and orphans weeping over the desolation of their hearts and homes, in France and Germany. We can convene a congress of the first and ablest jurists in Christendom. That is what we can do this very year in London or Amsterdam. We have connections enough, influence enough, and money enough, to do this thing—to convene the most august and influential assembly that ever met on earth to promote the peace and well-being of nations. There is no great writer or expounder of international law in Europe or America whom we cannot bring to such a congress, and who would not feel honored by being brought to take part in its deliberations and conclusions. If need be, and if they will accept it, we can defray all their expenses to and from, and during the congress. We can procure a hall in London, the Hague or Amsterdam worthy of such an assembly and its object. Their own character and standing, aside from this object, will command the profound respect and princely hospitalities and courtesies of the authorities and people of the capital chosen for their deliberations. We can send from America our first writers on Interna-

tional Law, such as President Wolsey, of Yale University, Bemis of Boston, David Dudley Field, of New York, our Charles Sumner, Seward and other experienced statesmen whose reputations are known in Europe. And what a delegation to the congress the friends of peace might enlist and send from England! What professor of International Law at Oxford or Cambridge, or writer or speaker on the jurisprudence recognized or required by the family of nations, would not feel it to be the most dignified and pleasant mission he ever filled, to meet in such a congress the most distinguished authors, statesmen and savans in Christendom? We have done twenty years ago a work of greater labor and difficulty than would be involved in the convocation of such an Ecumenical Council to establish among the nations the infallibility of truth and justice as the basis of their political creed and practice.

I feel confident that none of the friends of peace who remember what we have accomplished in past years will doubt our ability to convene such a Congress of Jurists and Publicists. Let us assume that we all believe that we can do this, and do it this very year. Well, what should we propose such a congress should put its hand to first? What is the first practical object it could and would accomplish? If it did not say a word, nor discuss a principle in secret session, the very meeting and mutual presence of such men under one roof would be a happy and influential event, and the first one of the kind the world ever witnessed. So far as we know, never did two great writers on International Law meet and sit down together to consult and compare notes, before they put forth those essays that contain all the authority the world has on the important subject. Grotius, Vattel, Puffendorf, Wheaton, Stowell, Kent, and Story were isolated writers, each issuing his views from his own private study. And yet how the great nations have referred and deferred to these individual, isolated authorities! Well, this is the first achievement we shall accomplish; we shall assemble in a congress all the living Vattels, Puffendorfs, Stowells, Wheatons, Kents, and Storys of Christendom. They will bring with them and unfold to each other all the erudition the past can supply and all they have added to the stock from their own researches. Out of these rich resources they will elaborate an International Code which all nations must accept as the highest legal authority that could be established by human learning and effort. This code will supply, as it were, the organic law for the action of any future Congress of Nations convened to settle some dispute or difficulty between them. Such a body can and will review, and pronounce a verdict upon, the opinions, principles and precedents on which the great Powers have acted in extreme cases and doubt-

ful transactions; so that forevermore none of them may plead differing or uncertain authorities for illegal and iniquitous proceedings.

This, then, is a work quite within the ability of the friends of peace in Europe and America this very year. It is a practical work in which all their young societies in France, Germany, and Holland would gladly and efficiently co-operate with us. It is an enterprise that would strengthen and unite us all round; that would raise our objects and efforts to a new and higher level before the Governments of Christendom; that would pave the way for that periodical Congress and permanent High Court of Nations which we all, as well as the French poet, have hoped, labored and prayed for: "The Federation of the World, the Parliament of Man."

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